This article characterises the ‘intellectual commons’, and the relationship between it, commoners and the state. It is argued that in a democracy the State should adopt a steward-type role over the intellectual commons. This role dictates that regulation should be in the best interests of the commoners, without undue interference with their inherent rights and will only be justified if it is based upon a coherent rationale. Economic theory can provide such a rationale when the costs of open entry to the commons exceed the benefits. Innovative, cooperative direct regulation has the best potential for success.
PAGES
275 – 289
DOI
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Issues
Also in this issue:
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Agnes Horvath, Magic and the Will to Science: A Political Anthropology of Liminal Technicality
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Gibson Burrell, Ronald Hartz, David Harvie, Geoff Lightfoot, Simon Lilley and Friends, Shaping for Mediocrity: The Cancellation of Critical Thinking at our Universities
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Bas de Boer, How Scientific Instruments Speak: Postphenomenology and Technological Mediations in Neuroscientific Practice
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Bjørn Lomborg, False Alarm
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How does innovation arise in the bicycle sector? The users’ role and their betrayal in the case of the ‘gravel bike’